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ABSTRACT
GATT/WTO firmly establishes a global free trade regime, which is dedicated to free and
freer global trade, to the benefit of all nations. However, trade liberalization poses great risk to
the environment, which has been in a process of deterioration. Thus, many countries, especially
developed ones, have begun to enact TREMs, with an eye to force, or induce other countries,
especially developing ones, to strengthen their commitment to environmental protection.
Developing countries feel they are targeted by developed ones mala fide. Thus, disputes and
debates arise. This thesis is an attempted effort made to point out that TREMs reflect a deep and
inevitable trade-environment conflict, to solve which the ultimate choice is environmental
protection cost internalization. This is especially true for developing countries, considering
GATT/WTO DSB and Appellate Body’s shifted attitude, which is given special attention in this
thesis, tilting toward recognizing TREMs enacted out of genuine environmental concerns.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
Greater liberalization of international trade in recent years notwithstanding, the multilateral
free trade regime, which has been well established by WTO, faces an impelling challenge: traderelated environmental measures (TREMs), which are unilateral trade measures adopted by
nations to protect the environment. 1 To date, as one of the most controversial issues in the
multifaceted relationship between international trade and global environment, 2 TREMs have
gained increased attention from the global community, especially developing nations, since
generally speaking, the latter is much more often targeted by TREMs.3 However, with respect to
the nature and other issues arising out of or related to TREMs, there exists a vast deal of
misconceiving among developing nations. It is one of the main purposes of this thesis to dispel
this kind of misapprehension.
With the utilization of TREMs coming to the forefront of international legal policy
development, TREMs have been challenged, argued and considered in a lot of forums, including
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Council and Secretariat.4 In recent years,
quite a few actions have been brought against the use of TREMs before the GATT/WTO Dispute
1

So TREMs do not include measures adopted under international agreements like TRIPS. It should be noted that
TREMs are not an abbreviation of an international agreement and that in fact there is no such international
agreement which focuses on the relationship of trade and environment administered under the WTO regime.
2
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Prosper
and Protect? 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1407-08 (1992) [hereinafter Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling].
3
It is especially true for those developing countries whose national economics deeply rely on the exports. For
example, China is an export-oriented country and the TREMs adopted by developed countries greatly affect the
merchandise exports of China.

2
Settlement Body and TREMs have generally been justified by developed countries by resorting
to Article XX of GATT, which outlines the general exceptions to the GATT free trade rules,
especially to the principles referred to by Article I and III. Through a detailed analysis of such
actions, it has been found out that, although for fifty years no country has succeeded in invoking
Article XX as a justification for the adoption of TREMs, 5 WTO has been gradually changing its
attitude towards TREMs and attempts to strike a balance between the right of a WTO member
state to use TREMs in pursuit of genuine environmental goals and that of other WTO member
nations to a liberalized trading system.6
While compared with the approach of environmental protection cost internalization, TREMs
are just the next better method to resolve the intractable trade-environment conflict, the birth and
development of TREMs just force developing countries to cognize the increasingly urgent appeal
for environmental protection and compel them to take positive actions to secure reasonable
concession and cooperation from the developed countries instead of stemming the torrent of the
global green tide stubbornly.
B. Structure
The rest of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter II summarizes definitions and
classifications of TREMs proposed and used in contemporary treatises. Then it goes on to give a
summary of the comprehension of TREMs by developing nations, which often fail to maintain
rationality and objectivity in regard to TREMs and take it for granted that TREMs are just
enacted by developed countries out of consideration for their own interests only with the aim to
contain exporting efforts of developing countries. In the eyes of most developing nations,
4

Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
599, 599 (1999).
5
Benjamin Simmons, In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, 24
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 419 (1999).

3
TREMs are mere non-tariff trade barriers under the cloak of environment protection. 7 This
attitude in part can be attributed to the sunk cost, namely the negative influence of colonialism
practiced by certain “imperialist” developed countries. The memory of this part of history is still
vivid in many developing countries.
Chapter III first points out that the origination of TREMs is rooted in the backdrop of
extreme degradation of the global environment and the consequent arousal of environmental
awareness throughout the world. Then it continues to argue that the very nature of TREMs is the
stark conflict between trade and environment.
Chapter IV chronicles and reviews several leading GATT/WTO decisions involving TREMs
as well as the trade-environment conflict. In doing so, it focuses mainly on the 1998
Shrimp/Turtle case, for it gives birth to four vitally important innovations and thus marks a great
turning point in the history of GATT/WTO.
An effort is made in Chapter V to seek out a possible approach to the problem of tradeenvironment conflict. From an economic perspective, it firstly analyses the traditional
comparative advantage theory and defects therein. Secondly it endeavors to illuminate that the
very root drive force behind TREMs is differing degrees of internalization of the environmental
protection cost. Thirdly, it identifies four reasons why developing countries should directly face
the reality and attempt to internalize the cost of environmental protection in the wake of the 1998
Shrimp/Turtle case. It is shown that, though it does raise cost of production, internalization of
environmental protection cost will not necessarily cost products of developing countries their
comparative advantages. Therefore, to avoid the vicious circle of poverty and degradation of the
6

Id. at 413.
For example, in China, a scholar maintained that the adopters of TREMs are lacking in sincerity to achieve
international cooperation on environment protection. See Yufang Wang, WTO Xieyi Lüse Tiaokuan he Lüse Maoyi
7
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environment, developing countries should assume their own responsibilities to protect
environment as well as seek out cooperation and support from developed countries to improve
their own and even the global environment.
Then comes the Chapter VI, the conclusion of this thesis: because the planet is shared by
everyone, including current and future generation of both developed and developing nations,8
trade liberalization should be used to maximize environmental objectives and everyone should
cooperate on a global level to achieve this goal.9

Bilei Wenti yu Duice [WTO Green Trade Article and Ways to Respond to Green Trade Barriers], in GUOJI JINGJIFA
LUNWEN ZHUANJI [SELECTED WORKS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW] 433 (Wei Zhao ed., 2000).
8
Richard Skeen, Will the WTO Turn Green? The Implications of Injecting Environmental Issues into the
Multilateral Trading System, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 161, 198-99 (2004).
9
The Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Klaus Toepfer, also argued that “the need
to ensure that both trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive is more pressing today than ever
before…Thus, further trade liberalization should be viewed not as an aim in itself, but as another tool by which we
can achieve sustainable development.” See UN: Promoting Linkages between Environment and Trade Policy, M2
Presswire, Nov. 29, 1999, quoted in Stephanie Carlsten, infra note, at 48.

5

CHAPTER II
TREMS, AND TREMS IN THE EYES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. The Conception of TREMs
In spite of the fact that more countries than before begin to use trade measures or tools for
environmental purposes, there still lacks a common framework for defining and categorizing
such measures or tools. As far as the appellations given to them are concerned, one commentator
called them “Environmental Trade Measures,”

10

another gave the name “unilateral

environmental trade measures,” 11 and others visually designated them as “Green Trade
Barrier.”12 Nevertheless, it seems that the “Trade-Related Environmental Measures” is the most
cogent expression.13 And it is also the appellation that is employed by this thesis.
Then what are TREMs? Or how to define TREMs? In this regard, there exist several opinions
too. However, these opinions are just as similar to one another as make no difference. 14

10
Steve Charnovitz, Trade and the Environment: The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23
ENVTL. L. 475, 490 (1992).
11
Atsuko Okubo, supra note 4, at 599.
12
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling, supra note 2, at 1408. However, it seems that since Dunoff, no one has adopted
this appellation, i.e. Green Trade Barrier. And in fact, there is an implied meaning in this appellation that such
measures or tools are a kind of trade barrier. Maybe just due to the lack of a superficially indifferent stance, this
appellation was not welcomed by most scholars.
13
Because such measures generally focus more on their environmental ends than on their means of restricting trade.
By the way, it is Paul Demaret that used the expression of “Trade-Related Environmental Measures” for the first
time and he explained that “the expression was coined so as to allow the use of the abbreviation TREMs, built on the
pattern of TRIPS and TRIMs.” See Paul Demaret, TREMs, Multilateralism, Unilateralism and the GATT, in 1
TRADE & THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 52, 52 (James Cameron, et al. ed., 3rd prtg. 1997). And
Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe also uses this name. See Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, The World Trade Organization and the
Protection of the Natural Environment: Recent Trends in the Interpretation of G.A.T.T. Article XX (b) and (g), 10
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 277 (2000).
14
However, in China, totally different definition was bestowed on TREMs. They were considered as one kind of
protectionism or hindrance to market access in the name of protecting the exhaustible resources, environment and
human health; and their purpose is to prevent the foreign products especially those from developing countries from
entering the domestic market or limit the importation of above-mentioned products by means of enacting stringent
environmental standards. See Lixin Huang, Lüse Bilei ji Woguo de Yingdui Celüe [Green Trade Barriers and
Choices for Our Country], WAIXIANG J INGJI [JOURNAL ON EXPORT-ORIENTED ECONOMY] (2000), at 254, quoted in

6
Generally speaking, TREMs are regarded as measures that primarily base their justification upon
the protection of the environment, but take the form of trade instruments.15
Moreover, mindful of the correlation between TREMs and multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs), someone alleged that although it is hazy sometimes, distinction should still
be made between TREMs resulting from MEAs and those which are unilaterally enacted by
some GATT member states. 16 Further, unilateral measures can fall into two different types:
TREMs aimed at protecting environmental interests located within the enacting state’s territorial
or personal jurisdiction and TREMs aimed at protecting environmental interests located outside
the enacting state’s territorial or personal jurisdiction.17
For the purposes of this thesis, TREMs means unilateral trade measures adopted by countries
to protect the environment no matter where the environmental interests locate.18
B. The Taxonomy of TREMs
There are several types of TREMs available to a country, which include import prohibitions,
export prohibitions, product standards, process standards, subsidies, taxes and tariffs, sanctions,
conditionality and eco-labeling.19

Jian Wang & Xiaomei Hong, Guoji Maoyi zhong de Lüse Bilei jiqi Falü Duice [Green Trade Barriers in
International Trade and Choices in Law], DONGBEI DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [NORTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL (ON SOCIAL SCIENCE)] (October 2004), at 254; Xiaoqin Zhu, WTO yu Lüse Bilei: Ruogan
Falü Wenti Fenxi [WTO and Green Trade Barriers: Analysis of Several Related Legal Issues], 4 XIAMEN DAXUE
XUEBAO (ZHESHE BAN) [XIAMEN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL (ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE)] (2001), at 83; and
Yanfang Li, Lüse Maoyi Bilei yu Qingjie Shengchan Lifa [Green Trade Barriers and Clean Production Legislation],
6 FAXUE LUNTAN [FORUM ON SCIENCE OF LAW] (2001), at 18.
15
Paul Demaret, supra note 13. Besides, Professor Jeffrey L. Dunoff thought that “the terms ‘trade barrier’ and
‘green trade barrier’ refer to import or export restrictions, taxes on products or means of production, and other
restrictions on the free flow of goods across national borders designed to serve environmental purposes”. See Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, Reconciling, supra note 2, at 1408 n.5. And someone just tersely described them as “trade tools generally
used for the protection of the environment by states.” See VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 396 (2003).
16
See Paul Demaret, supra note 13. See also VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, supra note 15, at 397. In the article
of Paul Demaret, he also elaborates on the aspects of TREMs which result from environmental conventions,
including their main features, their status under the GATT and their types etc. See Paul Demaret, id. at 53-59.
17
See Paul Demaret, supra note 13, at 60-61.
18
So TREMs adopted according to MEAs are not within the scope of this thesis.
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Import prohibitions impose restrictions on the importation of certain products, while export
prohibitions restrict the exportation of certain products.20 Product standards are regulations or
measures on domestic sales or transportation that apply to goods pari passu in international trade.
21

In contrast with product standards, process standards are regulations or measures on domestic

production as well as foreign production,22 which relate to the method by which a product is
manufactured, processed or produced (also referred to as “processing and production
methods”).23
Subsidies are grants or benefits to domestic production which may be utilized to encourage
conservation or to promote new environmental technologies.24
When as a type of TREMs, taxes and tariffs mean levies on trade for environmental goals.25
And sanctions penalize other nations for environmentally harmful actions. As a matter of fact,
very few countries have authorized such environmental trade sanctions in their laws.26
Conditionality is the extension or withholding of preferential treatment to a less developed
country depending on the environmental policies of that country.27

19

Steve Charnovitz, supra note 10, at 490 and James Cameron & Karen Campbell, Challenging The Boundaries of
The DSU through Trade and Environment Disputes, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
204, 220 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell ed., 1998).
20
Both of them are inconsistent with Article XI of GATT because they are prohibitions other than duties, taxes, or
other charges. See Steve Charnovitz, supra note.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 491.
23
Atsuko Okubo, supra note 4, at 609.
24
Steve Charnovitz, supra note 10, at 491. But just as the author pointed out, subsidies are domestic measures rather
than trade measures technically. However, subsidies can distort trade and therefore draw attention from the
international trading community. See id. n.65.
25
For example, the Superfund Revenue Act of 1986 imposed a tax on certain imported substances, such as styrene,
that include chemicals which are taxed under federal law. See id. at 491.
26
But there is still an example: the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizing the President to raise duties on
any fish from countries that refuse to participate in fishery conservation negotiations in good faith. See id. at 492.
27
Even though the GATT does permit preferential tariffs for less developed countries, such treatment is supposed to
be nonreciprocal and it is unclear what stance the GATT Council would take if any Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) program began to require environmental conditionality. See id.

8
Eco-labeling is defined by the use of labels to inform consumers that a particular product is
environmentally friendlier than other products in the same category.28 Due to the official hue and
governmental character attached to TREMs, eco-labeling, as a kind of TREMs, usually means
mandatory government-sponsored schemes.29
Among the nine types of TREMs which are enumerated above, product standards are least
controversial, for as long as they meet the national treatment requirement of Article III and the
most favored nation requirement of Article I,30 there is not much room to challenge them. By
contrast, process standards give rise to a lot of controversies, since they on the surface run afoul
of the “like products like treatment” principle firmly established under GATT/WTO. Import
restrictions, as the most typical manifestation of TREMs, are also very controversial, and they
are more often challenged, since they directly restrict developing countries’ exporting efforts.
We will encounter these two types of TREMs in the GATT/WTO TREM cases discussed in
Chapter IV below.
C. TREMs in the Eyes of Developing Countries
Just as some scholars have keenly observed, “most developing countries do not want
environmental issues to be part of the WTO discussions.”31 The deep concern which prevails
among developing countries is that developed countries may attempt to force onto them rules or
measures which delay their economic development and work to the unfair advantages of

28

Atsuko Okubo, supra note 4, at 601. Okubo analyzes the compatibility of the three schemes, especially the first
scheme, with the GATT/WTO regime at length. See id. at 610-634.
29
In practice, eco-labeling schemes can be divided by three main categories: mandatory government-sponsored
schemes, voluntary government-sponsored schemes and voluntary private-sponsored schemes. See id. at 603.
30
Steve Charnovitz, supra note 10, at 490.
31
Stephanie Carlsten, Trade and The Environment: The World Trade Organization Millennium Conference in
Seattle: The WTO Recognizes a Relationship Between Trade and the Environment and Its Effect on Developing
Countries, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. Y.B. 33, 43-44 (1999).

9
developed countries.32 Out of such a concern, developing countries have contended that, in a
word, TREMs are “thinly disguised non-tariff trade barriers” in violation of GATT/WTO.33 To
support such a contention, they have offered several arguments.
In the first place, developing countries argue that they are particularly vulnerable to the
possible discriminatory trade impacts of TREMs, as they frequently lack the necessary resources
and technique to meet the stringent environmental requirements.34
In the next place, by reason of the unilateral nature of TREMs and the different standards
adopted by the countries based on their respective national conditions, TREMs may to a great
extent increase costs for producers in developing countries if they have to meet a variety of
requirements in different markets, and inevitably impact adversely the competitive advantages of
small-scale producers.35
In the last place, TREMs used by developed countries are often devoid of transparency.
Foreign producers will run risk of denial of access to the information necessary to comply with
those measures. 36 Therefore, developing countries leap to a conclusion that developed countries
enact TREMs as surrogates or subterfuges for protectionist motivated rules to keep out
competition from products of developing countries and to protect their own national industries.37
A premise implied in the above-mentioned arguments is that no matter what measures
developed countries enact, as long as such measures will put developing countries at a
disadvantaged position, then they do aim at developing countries mala fide and developing
countries should object to them with a firm hand without further consideration of the rationality
32

John H. Jackson, Greening the GATT: Trade Rules and Environmental Policy, in 1 TRADE & THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 39, 50 (James Cameron et al. ed., 3rd prtg. 1997).
33
Atsuko Okubo, supra note 4, at 600.
34
Id. at 610. Though the argument is aiming at eco-labeling, it can be expanded to the variety of TREMs in the
opinion of this author.
35
Id. at 639.
36
Id. at 642

10
of such measures and the authenticity of the purported viciousness. True, from a historical view,
some “imperialist” developed countries shall answer, at least partly, for the underdeveloped
status of the economy and technology of some developing countries. Nevertheless, it does not
mean that to contain the development of developing countries is the first concern whatever
affairs developed countries are dealing with, not to say the only concern. In addition, the
negative effects wreaked by colonialism have, from an economic perspective, become sunk costs
which, just like spilled milk, do not deserve any tears. Most important of all, it cannot be well
proved that the springboard of enacting TREMs is to protect domestic market rather than the
environment, local or international,38 under the circumstances that environmental protection is a
true and genuine concern now throughout the world.39
Another denouncement of TREMs is that, when less and less room is left for the traditional
tariff and non-tariff barriers, developed countries merely enact more and more TREMs in view
of their own national interests and use them as a substitute tool to protect domestic industry and
increase domestic exportation. The trade-environment issue, as someone maintains, tightly
relates to the economic disparity and interest conflict between developing and developed
countries. 40 Such comments, while profound and persuasive on the surface, are untenable
because as a matter of fact most issues among the countries may boil down to a question of

37

John H. Jackson, supra note 32, at 44.
As it is discussed infra, it cannot be denied that the global environment has deteriorated to such an extent that
something should be done to improve it. See Chapter IV below, especial the part immediately before Section A.
39
See Chapter III (A) below.
40
Tianbao Qin, Huanbao Shidai Zhongguo Waimao de Falü Fenxi [China’s Foreign Trade in the Era of
Environmental Protection: Certain Legal Issues], 4 NINGXIA SHEHUI KEXUE [NINGXIA SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL]
(1999), at 28.
38

11
interest.

41

So it seems that developing countries cannot be justified in their hostility toward

TREMs.

41

Just like developing countries, developed countries also can find enough reasons to condemn that the former
fights against the TREMs just in the consideration of safeguarding the domestic industry with low environmental
attached value, therefore shirk responsibility to the international environment problems.

12

CHAPTER III
CLARIFICATION: THE BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF TREMS
But if the true nature of TREMs cannot be distilled from what developing countries are
thinking of, then what is the true nature of TREMs? To answer this question, this Chapter tries to
make a short historical review of background in which TREMs have come into being. Then, it
goes on to point out that TREMs are derived from the trade-environment conflict.
A. Background: Degradation of the Global Environment Aligned with the Arousal of
Environmental Awareness
Over a half century ago, the pioneering ecologist Aldo Leopold observed that “man’s
invention of tools has enabled him to make changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity, and
scope,” and the more violent the human changes, the greater the likelihood the affected
individuals, species, or ecosystems will never recover. 42 Since the industrial revolution, the
deterioration of natural resources was further supervened by the environmental pollution issue.
Then after World War II, as humankind has come to possess unparalleled power in history to
exploit and reclaim nature, environmental issues become more and more serious. The truth of
Leopold’s warning is validated especially in recent years and the environmental issues rising to
the international concern have “progressively advanced from purely local trans-boundary to
regional/continental and, lately, global dimensions.”43 At present, global environmental problems
include climate change, ozone depletion, nitrogen loading, species extinction, biodiversity loss,

42

VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, supra note 15, at 3.
Gunther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International Law, in 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 4 (Paula M. Pevato ed., 2003).
43

13
ocean pollution, natural areas destruction, deforestation, and desertification and so on.44 As a
matter of fact, broadly speaking the five vital problems that Earth faces, namely population,
resources, energy, food and environment fall into environmental problems and are affiliated
intimately with the imbalance of the ecological environment.
Under the circumstances, it is widely recognized that the environmental problems cannot be
fenced with and it leaves no time to delay to protect the Earth. Although environmental concerns
held a low priority in the early years of international trade,45 international environmental issues
have been moved from the periphery to the center of the world stage. 46 The arousal of
environmental awareness urges nations and international community to take steps to find a
solution to the problems.
In 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment was held at Stockholm47 and it was
“the first time that attention was drawn to the need to preserve natural habitats to produce a
sustained improvement in living conditions for all, and the need for international cooperation to
achieve this.”

48

In November 1991, Working Group on Environmental Measures and

International Trade was convened by the GATT contracting parties, and then environmental
issues were established within the multilateral trading system formally. 49 In 1994, WTO

44

And at a transboundary level, there are acid deposition, diminished freshwater quality and quantity, nuclear
accidents, sprawling urbanization, etc. See VED P. NANDA AND GEORGE PRING, supra note 15, at 4.
45
Richard Skeen, supra note 8, at 164.
46
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling, supra note 2, at 1407.
47
To date, over 500 international treaties and other agreements related to the environment have been concluded, and
around 60 per cent of such agreements postdated the Stockholm Conference. See Paula M. Pevato, Introduction to 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xxviii (2003).
48
1972: UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden, available at
http://www.are.admin.ch/are/en/nachhaltig/international_uno/unterseite02329/. And after this conference,
environmental issues slowly penetrated domestic and international policy in the mid-1970s. See Richard Skeen,
supra note 8, at 162.
49
Richard Skeen, supra note. It should be noted that there is no provisions in the original GATT document which
markedly addressed environmental protection, for the environment was not on the domestic policy agenda when the
GATT was signed in 1947. During that period, environmental protection agencies and environmental NGOs, such
as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and Friends of the Earth, did not exist in the United States and Europe. See

14
members established a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) at the first meeting of the
WTO General Council after the entry into force of the WTO.50 In a word, the protection of the
natural environment has become one of the international community’s greatest concerns.51
B. The Nature of TREMs: the Trade-Environment Conflict
It should be noted that the power of the existing international organizations, such as World
Health Organization, to deal with the environmental issues is quite dispersive and
notwithstanding the establishment of the CTE, the environment problem is not directly
incorporated into the holistic framework and legal regime of WTO. Therefore, severe
environmental problems press nations, especially developed countries, to pass laws and
regulations as well as use TREMs as a resort to improve or at least to prevent the deterioration of
the environment.
Environmentalists opine that even though TREMs are not the perfect instrument to solve
environmental problems, they are, in great part, the only instrument available. There exists no
higher sovereignty surpassing all the countries in the international level, so it is much more
effective to protect environment by dint of TREMs than by other means, since TREMs can press
relevant countries to pay attention to this issue and induce them to either positively or passively
take some actions.
However, the adoption of such TREMs, to a certain extent, run afoul of the free trade tenet
advocated by WTO and deviate from some basic principles of WTO. All in all, TREMs present
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the fierce conflict between the imperative of environmental protection and prohibition of such
measures in international trade regime.52
1. Interests Served by the International Trade vs. Environmental Interests
a. Interests Served by the International Trade Regime
For the purpose of this section, it is quite necessary to observe the three primary interests
served by the international trade regime.53 The first interest is the economic interest.54 During the
inter-war years, barriers to international trade helped to deepen and prolong the Great Depression.
Learning from this lesson, the post-war trading regime was designed to eliminate all kinds of
barriers to trade as well as discrimination in trade. 55 Multilateral efforts have been made to
achieve such goals, and the most visible efforts are the actions of several different groups of
nations to establish various forms of economic integration,56 such as the European Community,
the North American Free Trade Agreement and, of course, the GATT. As the most influential
international trade agreement, the GATT has successfully reduced tariffs on international trade
and has promoted trade by eliminating other impediments to trade, namely, the “non-tariff trade
barriers.”57 It is believed that liberal trade would best increase the efficiency of international
production and promote the aggregate welfare of all nations.58
Respect for the national sovereignty of all nations is a second significant interest. National
sovereignty, as the corner stone of contemporary international law, means the fundamental legal
status of a nation “that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental or
52
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judicial jurisdiction of a foreign nation or to foreign law other than public international law.”59
While participating in the international trade regime does make nations surrender some degree of
sovereignty, the trade regime in turn advances the interest in sovereignty in some other
respects.60 For example, it is not permissible under the trade regime for one state to interfere in
the internal or domestic affairs of another state.61
Thus, in addition to promoting international trade, the GATT serves the goal of enhancing
national sovereignty. 62 The GATT drafters sought to maximize the ability and authority of each
nation to set its own economic and political policies without interference from other nations.63
However, nowadays, the rights deriving from national sovereignty are not unlimited freedoms
but powers shared between the holder of the power and the community of states, and sovereignty
“has become the legal basis for inclusion, or of a commitment to co-operate for the good of the
international community at large.”64
The third related interest is the interest in political harmony. 65 Based on the underlying
theory that the elimination of trade restrictions creates economic interdependence and economic
integration, the GATT bends itself to eliminate political frictions and conflicts caused by trade
restrictions and has enjoyed great success in this respect.66
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The three interests set forth above have been continually used to strike down trade
restrictions intended to preserve environmental resources, including TREMs.67
b. Environmental Interests
Because different TREMs are designed to protect different environmental interests, it is
helpful and convenient to summarize the main environmental interests concisely. 68 The
environmental interests have a quite broad spectrum, which consist of international watercourses,
marine environment, control of hazardous waste, atmosphere and outer space, and conservation
of nature, ecosystems and biodiversity etc. 69 Of these widely recognized genuine and true
environmental interests, atmosphere, biodiversity and the duty not to harm the global commons
are the most noticeable ones.
It is acknowledged that the upper atmosphere of the Earth is outside the jurisdiction of any
single nation and therefore is a global common resource. 70 Like the high seas, the global
atmosphere must be used with reasonable regard for other states’ rights, including protection of
their environment and human health.71 In recent years, international efforts to protect the global
atmosphere have focused on ozone depletion and global warming.72
Biodiversity, i.e., biological diversity, is the variability of life in all its forms, levels and
combinations; and it is most expediently, but not exclusively, defined in terms of three
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conceptual levels: ecosystem diversity, species diversity and genetic diversity. 73 Biological
resources are vital to human existence since they supply the essential materials to life on the
planet. 74 However, it is woeful that attributable to the wrongdoing of humankind much
biodiversity has been and is being lost through extinction due to the loss of natural habitats.75
Such threats have attracted intense attention of many nations and some important multilateral
treaties have been set down.76
As to the duty not to harm the global commons,77 it seems to have become a self-evident rule
that nations should ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause damages to the
environment beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, including the global commons.78 The duty
not to harm the environment outside a country’s borders has manifested in a number of United
Nations resolutions and treaties.79
2. The Relation between Trade and Environment
As is shown above, on the one hand, the protection of the environment has become one of the
international community’s great concerns and on the other hand, it is at the same time recognized
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that international trade liberalization should be promoted to the good of all nations.80 This kind
of tension between trade liberalization and environmental protection has spawned arguments on
the relationship between trade and environment.
Some commentators, especially trade proponents, have argued that at least theoretically the
enhancement of trade liberalization is capable of promoting higher environmental standards,
because international trade would reward those who can use natural resources in the most
efficient manner, then promote efficient allocation of resources as well as reduce the burthen on
the environment derived from non-optimal uses of resources.81 In addition, trade liberalization is
of great importance for enhancing international economic growth, 82 therefore the increase of
wealth resulting from trade liberalization allows for greater financial resources to be employed in
scientific research and environment-friendly technology. 83 Moreover, trade proponents also
support their allegation by empirical evidence which indicates that wealthier countries on
average have much stricter environmental standards than poorer countries.84 The WTO special
studies on trade and environment which were issued in 1999 mentioned that “pollution levels
tend to be significantly higher in countries with a skewed income distribution, a high level of
illiteracy, and few political and civil liberties.”85 Viewed under this light, it appears that trade
liberalization and environmental protection may work harmoniously.86
Yet, the other side of the coin also warrants examination.
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Firstly, free trade in itself (by its mere existence) may represent a serious threat to the
conservation of the natural environment, as some, especially environmentalists, have maintained
radically.87
Secondly, trade liberalization may impose increased development pressure on countries,
especially those who fail to enact stringent domestic legislation to protect environment, and
encourage them to over-exploit natural resources in order to satisfy increased domestic as well as
international demand.88
Thirdly, expanded trade may lead to such problems as pollution havens and the lowest
common denominator approach to environmental regulation 89 and trigger a so-called “race to
the bottom,” for to seize hold of a larger market share, countries are apt to prefer lax
environmental standards either consciously or unconsciously. 90
Lastly but not the least importantly, as environmentalists have maintained, the alleged most
efficient resource allocation without regard to the origin, as is advocated by proponents of free
trade, in reality leads to environmental damages and ignores other values. 91 And additional
resources and wealth derived from market growth through trade liberalization may not benefit
the environment because it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the value of the environment
per se accurately.92 Furthermore, the irretrievability of environmental damages and the inherent
limitation of recuperating such loss may make it impossible to use the additional resources and
87
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wealth to improve the environmental standards. In addition, as environmentalists further point
out, the growth of welfare generated by trade liberalization would be quite destructive where
prices of products do not reflect environmental costs.93
Maybe it is hard to accept the concept that free trade in itself is a serious threat to the
environment. It is the same hard, however, to deny that the next three points have their strength
and force. This is supported by discussion in Section A, Chapter V below of the defects of the
traditional basis of the world free trade regime: the theory of comparative advantage. As is
shown in that Section, the externality of environmental problems and scarcity of resources was
ignored by the theory of comparative advantage. It is this very kind of ignorance at bottom that
determines that the world free trade regime has ignored the environment until very recently.
Thus, it might be true that theoretically free trade in the long run is good for the environment.
But only “theoretically,” and only “in the long run.” Please remember that the world of reality is
not a “theoretically” perfect world: the free trade regime is based on a theory with defects
especially bad for the environment.
C. Justifiable versus Unjustifiable TREMs
Though it is hard to draw a definite conclusion on the debate mentioned above, it may be safe
to draw a tentative conclusion that, while trade liberalization may have its pros, it at the same
time may have its cons and it may at least be contributing to environmental degradation.94 Or to
say the least, it is evident that the essential issue involved in the debate is the inevitable tension
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between promoting free trade and protecting the environment.95 It is out of this very tension that
TREMs have emerged and developed and can be justified.
TREMs are one useful way to address the “collective action” problems related to multilateral
efforts to protect the global commons.96 By adopting TREMs, nations that take action to preserve
global commons in discharging their obligations under an environmental treaty can exclude noncooperating nations from enjoying the “public good” created by the former and thereby
encourage the latter to join the treaty regime.97
More importantly, as a practical matter, few other means are available for nations to cause
other states to protect global common resources.98 On the one hand, less coercive measures, for
example, diplomatic pressure, are not sufficiently enough to persuade nations to change their
environmental practices.99 On the other hand, it is quite understandable that nations are often not
willing to adopt more coercive measures, such as the threat or use of force, against another
country simply because the latter participates in trades that will lead to negative consequences
for the environment.100
In a word, while TREMs are not able to address the inevitable conflict between trade
liberalization and environmental protection root and branch like some environmentalists expect,
there is no question about it that TREMs for the purpose of protecting environment are of great
benefit to the ecological environment and the life and health of human, animal or plant.101 It is
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not only extreme but also improper to label TREMs “green trade barriers” at large and thereby
oppose and stick up to them blindly.
However, there is a problem that most TREMs will contain some incidental “protectionist”
element, whether it is a domestic environmental standard or a regulation on imported products.102
Thus, technically speaking, every TREM runs afoul of the free trade tenet carefully guarded by
GATT/WTO. So it is quite imaginable that to decide whether or not a TREM is motivated
primarily by protection or conservation of the environment could be very arduous.103 Then how
can the WTO Dispute Settlement Body tell justifiable TREMs from “protectionism disguised as
environmental protection?”104 What is the criterion?
It is admitted that any sovereign country is entitled to employ legislative and administrative
instruments to protect and preserve domestic environment. Only those measures that are adopted
out of the exclusive purpose to throw obstacles in the way of foreign products’ access to the
domestic market and thereby have distorted the international trade order can be specified as
“unjustifiable.” 105 However, “purpose,” as a kind of subjective intention, is very difficult to
ascertain. Thus, to make an evenhanded judgment, we have to examine the exterior manifestation
of each TREM, or we run the risk of being stuck in the mire of arbitrariness and unjustness.

102

David Pearce, The Greening of the GATT: Some Economic Considerations, in 1 TRADE & THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 20, 28 (James Cameron, et al. ed., 3rd prtg. 1997). Someone thinks that there are three
most important reasons for which nations adopt TREMs. Firstly, nations use them to protect or enhance their
domestic environmental quality. The second reason is to motivate other nations to enact more effective
environmental controls or to retaliate upon nations that are not willing to adopt adequate environmental standards.
“In either case the motive is not only to protect the environment but also to level the competitive playing field, so
that lax environmental regulation cannot be used to gain a comparative advantage in international commerce.”
Thirdly, nations employ trade restrictions aiming to protect the global environment and preserve resources outside
the boundaries of national jurisdictions. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade-Related Environmental Measures
(TREMs): The United States Perspective, in 1 TRADE & THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 366, 366
(James Cameron, et al. ed., 3rd prtg. 1997).
103
David Pearce, supra note.
104
Tanyarat Mungkalarungsi, The Trade and Environment Debate, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 367 (2002).
105
Xiaoqin Zhu, supra note 13, at 19.

24
Thus, some principles are proposed which may be useful to test whether or not a TREM is
justifiable, especially when the purpose of the TREM is to preserve the global commons.106
According to the opinion of Professor Jeffrey L. Dunoff, the principles would examine: the type
and strength of the interest, whether the TREM discriminates between foreign nations or between
foreign and domestic products, and whether the TREM is related to and proportionate to the
purported environment goal.107
Concretely, we need firstly to identify the nature of interest being protected and to ensure that
the measure is truly designed to protect the environment.108 After that, it is necessary to analyze
the strength of the interest in the protected resource. 109 One approach which can be used to
achieve this goal is to determine whether the specific environmental interest at stake is the object
of protection under certain customary or treaty law.110 If a measure concerns resources outside
the protection scope of international environmental law,111 it “could be justified by scientific
evidence regarding the specific environmental threat.”112 In evaluating this principle, the country
employing the TREMs ought to undertake the burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate that
the restriction has a scientific foundation.113
Secondly, TREMs should not discriminate among foreign products, or between foreign and
domestic products. This nondiscrimination principle is also deeply embedded in international
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trade regime, especially in the GATT.114 The Reformulated Gasoline case brought by Brazil and
Venezuela against the U.S. is a very good example to illustrate this principle.115 According to the
1990 Clean Air Amendments (“CAA”)116 which was passed to reduce air pollution by motor
vehicle emissions, in 1994, the United States Environmental Protection Agency promulgated its
final rule “Fuels and Fuel Additives - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline”
(“EPA rule”)117 to meet the objective of vehicle emission reductions designated by the CAA.118
The new EPA rule provided different methods of determining baselines for acceptable quality of
gasoline for domestic refiners and importers of gasoline separately,119 and it allowed the U.S.
refiners access to the market with domestically established “baseline” fuel content while imports
of foreign gasoline could not use the 1990 baseline and thereby had to abide by more stringent
statutory baselines.120 The WTO dispute panel held that the EPA rule which refused to recognize
foreign refinery baseline and then left them at a competitive disadvantage was discriminatory,121
and as a result, inconsistent with Article III of the GATT, i.e. the National Treatment. 122 In
addition, the Panel drew a conclusion that the measure adopted by the U.S. did not fall within the
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protection of Article XX (b) and XX (g) exceptions.123 Although the U.S. appealed the Panel’s
decision to the WTO Appellate Body, the same conclusion as the Panel was arrived.124
Lastly, the TREMs employed should be related to and proportionate to the environmental
interest which is sought to be protected.125 This means that first of all, a TREM must be related
to the offensive activity that it seeks to halt, i.e., “a due relation between means and ends has to
be observed.”126 Next, while the doctrine of proportionality is also applied as a restriction on
state action under many other circumstances, here, it means that TREMs should not occasion
disproportionate effects. 127 The use of the principles of relatedness and proportionality as
limiting tests in this context can act as a check on the protectionist impulse.128
D. Summary
This chapter, by looking at the general background against which TREMs have emerged,
claims that TREMs have their reasonableness rooted deep in history, one that has been
witnessing the fast and widespread deterioration of environment, which is aggravated, at least to
a certain extent, by trade liberalization almost of the same time (Section A). Not surprisingly,
most TREMs have an undeniable “protectionist” implication: on the objective level, they have
the effect of restricting trade. Thus, we see that trade liberalization pulls one way, while TREMs
pull the other way. In another word, there is an inherent trade-environment conflict reflected in
TREMs. In addressing this conflict, it is important to recognize that both trade liberalization and
environmental protection have their respective legitimate ends (Section B). What is inherent in
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such a recognition is that, TREMs shall not be rejected completely, since they may be designed
out of a true concern of environment, and they shall not be hailed blindly, since they may be
designed out of a trade protectionist concern with an environmental glossing. In a word, there are
justifiable TREMs and unjustifiable ones (Section C). Though neither trade nor environment
shall be given a preference at the expense of the other, in order to address the delicate balance
between trade and environment, that there are justifiable TREMs needs to be more emphasized,
since traditionally this point is not recognized by the global free trade regime and it is especially
contested heavily by developing countries, who tend to view TREMs only as trade protectionist
measures. Or put it another way, developing countries need to change their attitude of blanket
objection to TREMs.
Therefore, this chapter, by clarifying the general historical background, the true nature of
TREMs and that there are justifiable TREMs (though there are at the same time unjustifiable
ones), functions as a rebuttal to Section C of Chapter II where the attitude of developing
countries to TREMs is generalized. But if such an analytical rebuttal in this chapter is not enough,
it is shown in the following chapter that, on a practical level, developing countries have to
change their attitude as early as possible for their own good: the development of the
GATT/WTO TREMs jurisprudence clearly indicates that the GATT/WTO framework is actually
admitting that there are justifiable TREMs. This means that if developing countries do not adapt
their attitude accordingly, they may be forced to do so very soon.
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CHAPTER IV
TREMS TESTED UNDER THE GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: THE
CHALLENGE AND TURNING POINT
It is well-known that the GATT’s specific purpose has been, until now, to promote the trade
liberalization129 and like most other post-war trade agreements on free trade areas and customs
unions, the text of GATT 1947 did not clearly address the issue of protecting environment.130
However, “the GATT dispute settlement system has been used more frequently for the settlement
of environmental disputes between states than any other international dispute settlement
mechanism.” 131 There are seven panel reports on TREMs which had been submitted to the
GATT Council as of the termination of the GATT 1947, moreover, the first panel report under
the WTO dispute settlement system also focused on the GATT legitimacy of TREMs.132
Although the GATT has been criticized by environmentalists that it has not incorporated the
environmental issue into its regime133 and the GATT has been relatively sluggish to respond to
such criticism on account of such extraneous environmental policy’s implications on trade
policy, 134 the GATT has undergone some remarkable changes towards the trade-environment
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debate. These changes, which drop a hint that the WTO has begun to pay more attention to the
environmental protection, deserve attention for the purpose of this thesis.
Firstly, in 1994 the WTO was established by the final act of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, and the recognition of sustainable development was for the first time included in
the Marrakesh Agreement’s preamble as the WTO’s overarching objective.135 According to the
preamble, the goals of trade liberalization should be pursued “while allowing for the optimal use
of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic
development.” 136 This means that the risks associated with unimpeded trade finally are
recognized and a balance between trade liberalization and environmental protection so as to
achieve the ultimate goal of sustainable development is called upon by the preamble.137
Secondly, in 1999, the WTO presented a special study on trade and environment 138 to
manifest what the WTO considers as “sweeping generalizations” about interaction between trade
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and environment.139 In this report, the WTO surprisingly candidly conceded that global trading
systems do, in some circumstances, defeat environmental standards and therefore harm the
environment.140 Further, by recognizing that “not all kinds of growth are equally benign for the
environment,”141 the WTO Report, to some extent, retouched “the common trade liberalization
assumption that environmental protection increases as income increases in developing
countries.”142
In fact, such gradual changes of the WTO’s stance toward the trade-environment debate are
also reflected in the panel decisions related to TREMs delivered by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (“DSB”), since the most fundamental and controversial issue confronting the WTO in the
trade-environment debate is whether TREMs purporting to protect the environment are
compatible with the GATT/WTO law system.143 It will be very instructive to study the GATT
case law on TREMs.144 In these cases, Article XX of the GATT may be the most frequently cited
justification for a TREM which is accused of running afoul of the GATT’s anti-discrimination
provisions.145 Article XX consists of two parts, the introductory clause (chapeau) and the list of
exceptions detailing the article’s scope:
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
139
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(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”146
A. The GATT Panel Report on Tuna/Dolphin I
The GATT dispute resolution panel report, United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
(hereinafter “Tuna/Dolphin I”)147 “represented the first instance” in which a GATT panel had
been requested to examine the consistency of a unilateral trade measure to protect a global
resource with the GATT law system.148
1. Background
In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, dolphins and tuna regularly swim directly above
schools of yellowfin tuna.149 The dolphins come to the surface to breathe and therefore are easy
to be discovered by fishing vessels.150 Fishermen, by looking for dolphins, avail themselves of
the tuna/dolphin relationship and cast their huge purse seine nets around dolphins in order to
catch the tuna below the surface.151 This method injures or drowns dolphins and makes them the
unfortunate and “incidental” victims of the tuna catch.152 Under this circumstance, in 1972, the
U.S. Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”)153 which was designed to
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reduce the incidental injuring and killing of dolphins due to the above-mentioned fishing
method.154
The MMPA bans the “taking” 155 of marine mammals without a permit and only the
American Tuna-Boat Association was accorded such a permit prior to the case.156 The MMPA
also requires the Secretary of the Treasury to ban the importation of tuna caught by foreign
fishermen who use technology resulting in incidental killing or injuring marine mammals in
excess of U.S. standards.157 In 1988, the Congress amended the MMPA, pursuant to which, the
U.S. put import prohibitions on tuna and tuna products from Mexico and some other states.158
2. Main Arguments
In 1991, Mexico filed a grievance to the GATT and at the instance of Mexico, a dispute
panel was convened.159 Mexico maintained that the prohibitions violated the GATT Article XI
which forbids quantitative restrictions; was inconsistent with the GATT Article XIII because it
imposed discrimination on a particular geographical region; and breached the GATT Article III
in that Mexico could not know the average kill rate of the U.S. vessels until the end of the
season.160
The U.S. countered that the import prohibitions were internal regulations consistent with
Article III: 4; and that in the event that the prohibitions were inconsistent with Article III, they
should fall within Article XX(b) and XX(g) exceptions.161
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3. The GATT Panel Decision
The Panel submitted a report on the Tuna/Dolphin I case in favor of Mexico.162 Firstly, the
Panel examined that whether the import prohibitions were internal regulations under Article III
or quantitative restrictions under Article XI. The Panel found that “the Note Ad Article III covers
only those measures that are applied to the product as such,”163 and since the import prohibitions
were related to the production process rather than any inherent characteristic of the produce, i.e.,
yellowfin tuna, itself, 164 the Panel came to the conclusion that the import prohibitions did not
constitute internal regulations covered by the Note Ad Article III.165 The Panel further pointed
out that even if the provisions of the MMPA were regarded as regulating the sale of tuna as a
product, it would be hard for them to meet the requirements of Article III because Article III:4
obliges the U.S. to accord Mexican treatment no less favorable than that accorded to U.S. tuna
without regard to whether the method of catch by Mexico vessels corresponds to that of U.S.
vessels, 166 and Article III:4 calls for a comparison between products of the exporting and
importing nations, and not a comparison between different nation’s production processes that
have no effect on the product per se.167
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Secondly, the Panel concluded that the import prohibitions violated Article XI which forbids
the use of quotas, embargoes and other “quantitative” restrictions on imports and exports in that
they obviously contradicted the general prohibition on quantitative import restrictions.168
Finally, the Panel considered whether the import prohibitions could be covered by Article
XX (b) and XX (g) exceptions. The text of Article XX (b) does not clearly answer the basic
question whether or not this provision covers measures necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health outside the jurisdiction of the importing party, the Panel thus resorted to the
scant drafting history.169 The Panel decided that “the record indicates that the concerns of the
drafters of Article XX (b) focused on the use of sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of
humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing country.”170 In addition, the
Panel held that the U.S. measure was not “necessary” as required by Article XX (b), because the
U.S. had not exhausted all options reasonably available for the protection of dolphins that were
less trade restrictive or inconsistent with GATT rules. 171 Moreover, since the permissible
Mexican incidental dolphin taking rate for a particular period was linked to the actual taking rate
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of the U.S. vessels during that same period,172 the Panel held that a prohibition based on such
unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as necessary to protect the health or life of
dolphins.173
With respect to Article XX(g), the Panel employed the same reason as it used in the
discussion of Article XX(b) to arrive at the conclusion that Article XX(g) did not operate extrajurisdictionally.174 Even if Article XX(g) could be applied extra-jurisdictionally, the Panel noted
that the U.S. measures did not meet the conditions set out in Article XX(g) which required that a
measure could be considered as “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”
only if it was primarily aimed at such conservation.175 This requirement was not met because the
conformity with U.S. standards asked the Mexican authorities to know the average taking rate of
dolphins achieved by the U.S. fishermen during the same period of time and this constituted
“unpredictable conditions.”176 Therefore, the U.S. measure cannot be justified by Article XX(g)
either.
The Panel’s decision in this case was subjected to some criticism after it was circulated in the
international community. 177 But at that time, the interest in liberalized trade was so deeply
embedded in the GATT context that the Panel, taking into account the effect of “slippery
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slope,”178 felt no need even to attempt to describe the benefits or interests served by the U.S.
prohibition.179
B. The GATT Panel Report on Tuna/Dolphin II
Three years later, in United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (hereinafter
“Tuna/Dolphin II”), 180 another GATT panel heard a challenge brought by the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the Netherlands against the secondary embargo provision of
the MMPA. 181 According to the secondary embargo provision of the MPPA, intermediary
nations exporting tuna or tuna products to the U.S. must certify and provide reasonable proof that
the tuna had not originated from nations who were subject to the direct embargo.182
The EEC and the Netherlands argued that the secondary embargo was inconsistent with the
GATT Article III, which authorizes internal regulations that treat domestic and foreign products
alike; that the embargo also breached Article XI’s forbiddance against quantitative restrictions
except tariffs; and that it could not be justified by Article XX.183
Again, the panel reiterated that Article III was not applicable because the regulations were
directed at harvesting and not the product as such.184
The Panel then examined whether the United States measures were consistent with Article
XI:1. 185 The Panel noted that the embargoes imposed by the U.S. were “prohibitions or
restrictions” in the terms of Article XI, because they banned the import of tuna or tuna products
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from any country not meeting certain policy conditions and they were not “duties, taxes or other
charges.” Therefore the embargoes were inconsistent with Article XI:1.186
The U.S. argued that both the primary and intermediary nation embargoes, even if
inconsistent with Articles III or XI, could be justified by Article XX (g) as measures relating to
the conservation of dolphins, an exhaustible natural resource, that there was no requirement in
Article XX (g) for the resources to be within the territorial jurisdiction of the country taking the
measure, and that the measures were taken in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production as well as met the requirement of the preamble to Article XX.187
In response, the Panel outlined a three-step analysis under Article XX (g).
First, it had to be determined whether the policy in respect of which these provisions were
invoked fell within the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources.188 The Panel
recognized that dolphins were an exhaustible natural resource because they could potentially be
exhausted.189
This is a significant ruling about Article XX (g) in terms of the broad interpretation of the
meaning of “exhaustible natural resources” in Article XX (g).190 “This opened the door, if even
just a crack, to future justification of unilateral environmental trade measures for the protection
of the global environment.” 191
More importantly, the Panel set aside the extra-jurisdictional interpretation in respect to the
scope of Article XX in Tuna/Dolphin I and stated that there is “no valid reason supporting the
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conclusion that the provisions of Article XX (g) apply only to policies related to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources located within the territory of the contracting party invoking the
provision.”192 The Panel consequently held that the policy to conserve dolphins in the eastern
tropical Pacific Ocean, which the United States pursued within its jurisdiction over its nationals
and vessels, was covered by Article XX (g).
Second, it had to be determined whether the measure was primarily aimed at the conservation
of dolphins, as that is the meaning the Panel rendered to the expression “related to,” and the
Panel had to inquire into whether it was necessary for domestic requirement to be effective.193 In
view of the fact that the U.S. prohibited tuna imports without regard to “whether or not the
particular tuna was harvested in a way that harmed or could harm dolphins,” the Panel held that
both the primary and intermediary nation embargoes were taken so as to force other countries to
change their policies with respect to persons and things within their own jurisdiction,” so such
embargoes could not be justified by Article XX (g).194
The third step was to determine whether the measure was applied in conformity with the
requirement set out in the preamble to Article XX.195 As an essential condition of Article XX (g)
had not been met, the Panel considered that it was not necessary to examine whether the U.S.
measures had also met the other requirements of Article XX. Accordingly it found that the
embargoes maintained by the U.S. inconsistently with Article XI:1 were not justified by Article
XX (g).196
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The above two TREM cases were decided under the old dispute settlement procedure under
the GATT before the establishment of WTO. The old procedure commenced with bilateral
consultations.197 If such consultations and the supervening outside intervention and assistance all
sustained failure, a party could request to establish a panel to hear the dispute.198 After the panel
received submissions from the disputing parties and possibly other interested nations, it then
circulated proposed reports to the contending parties on a confidential basis for their review and
comments.199 Taking into account the comments, the panel submitted its report to the GATT
Council. 200 However, a panel decision was not “adopted” by the Council unless all parties
consented to the adoption.201 This procedure was criticized as being ineffective and sometimes
arbitrary. 202 In response to such criticism, in 1994, the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(“DSU”), “a more standardized and legalized dispute resolution process,”203 was adopted in the
Uruguay Round.204 The new system begins with the modification of the procedures by which
disputes are heard and resolved, at the same time, ends with the appellate process which
standardizes the interpretation of legal issues within the GATT. 205 Under the new system,
“within sixty days of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at
a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or
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the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.”206 Evidently, this innovation adds a lot of
reliability and stableness to the WTO decisions. Moreover, once a decision is appealed, the
Appellate Body is proffered broad discretion and may modify or reverse the legal findings of the
panel.207 This makes the dispute settlement process look more like a judicial process and this
process may bring forth a more coherent, principled and uniform case-law. 208 Thus, quite
naturally, the GATT/WTO DSB has showed its immense potential to be an effective forum for
the handling of trade-environment disputes.209 This point is substantiated in the following cases,
as we will see.
C. The Reformulated Gasoline Case
The Reformulated Gasoline Case was the first dispute referred to the Appellate Body under
the DSU after the WTO was established. 210 Though that kind of conservative stance (as is
exemplified in the two Tuna/Dolphin cases) of the GATT Panel that constantly gives priority to
trade liberalization in addressing the TREMs continued into this case, the new GATT dispute
settlement system, through its Appellate Body, did bring forth some fresh air into the debate on
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TREMs by indicating that TREMs may be held compatible with GATT as long as they were
nondiscriminatory and not disguised restrictions on trade. 211
In this case, 212 Venezuela and Brazil requested the Panel to find that the final rule
promulgated by the U. S. EPA on 15 December 1993 was contrary to Articles I (Most Favored
Nation Treatment) and III (National Treatment) of GATT 1994, was not covered by any of the
exceptions under Article XX, and violated Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT).213 The U.S. countered that the EPA rule was consistent with Articles I and Article
III and fell within the scope of Article XX (b), (d), and (g) of GATT 1994.214
The WTO dispute panel found that chemically-identical imported and domestic gasoline
were like products under Article III:4 and therefore held that the baseline establishment methods
contained in the EPA rule constituted a violation of GATT Article III.215 Furthermore, the Panel
found that the measure did not meet the requirements under Article XX (b), XX (d) and XX (g),
and could not be justified under them.216
The U.S. appealed the decision to a WTO Appellate Body. The Appellate Body affirmed the
Panel discussion but on different grounds and established a new framework analysis for Article
XX exceptions.217
Firstly, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s ruling that the measures were not primarily
related to the conservation of exhaustible resources and arrived at a contrary conclusion, while it
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affirmed that to reduce the depletion of clean air which was a “natural resource” was a policy to
conserve an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g).218
Next, the Appellate Body found that the EPA Rule was legitimate environmental policy
measure which fell within the terms of the GATT Article XX (g) exception. 219 Then the
Appellate Body turned its attention to the introductory provisions of Article XX. Here, a twotiered analysis was set forth for the first time: first, provisional justification by reason of
characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the same measure
under the introductory clauses of Article XX.220 Although the baseline establishment rules fell
within Article XX (g) exception, the Appellate Body stressed that the failure of the U.S. to
consult with affected nations so as to address the potential inequitable application of the baseline
standards equaled to unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised restriction on international trade
which were prohibited by the chapeau of Article XX.221 So the U.S. measures did not meet the
requirement within such introductory provisions and could not be justified by Article XX.
The Reformulated Gasoline case demonstrates the evolution of the DSB’s application of
GATT rules and the DSB’s new expansive view of what constitutes a permissible exception.222
By widening the scope for acceptance of TREMs under Article XX exceptions, the Appellate
Body ruling holds open a door for environmental protection within the GATT regime,223 as it
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seems to allow more exceptions into GATT as long as such measures are nondiscriminatory and
not disguised restrictions on trade.224
D. Turning Point: the 1998 Shrimp/Turtle Case
The Tuna/Dolphin II ruling and the Reformulated Gasoline ruling kindled a lot of sharp
debates in the international community. At the bottom, the diction of the GATT Article XX is so
ambiguous and broad as to invite many divergences.225 In addition, there are not any procedural
requirements about recovery, ratification or notice in this Article and the only way to know
whether this Article could be availed of to justify a TREM is to resort to the GATT dispute
settlement body. These facts make it very uncertain for any country to invoke Article XX as the
justification of a TREM. Since TREMs, in substance, run afoul of the fundamental tenet of the
WTO, the nation who attempts to adopt TREMs to protect environment inevitably runs the risk
of being found in violation of the GATT by the GATT DSB. In fact, to date, almost all the
nations adopting TREMs in those cases that were referred to the GATT/WTO DSB have failed
in their efforts to justify TREMs.226
However, the WTO has gradually come to realize that its view on TREMs is unadvisable in
the long run and there is inherent conflict between its trade-priority approach and the
international trend to protect environment. Just as one commentator has accurately observed, the
224
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1998 Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body report represents the boldest attempt by a WTO dispute
mechanism body to strike a balance between trade liberalization and environmental protection.227
In that report, a surprising effort was made to reverse the preference in favor of trade
liberalization in the trade-environment debate.
1. Backdrop of the 1998 Shrimp/Turtle Case
It is widely recognized that sea turtles are threatened with extinction.228 As a matter of fact,
all seven sea turtle species inhabiting the world’s oceans are protected at the international level
by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) and by the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals
(Bonn Convention).229 Among the several factors that have led to the demise of sea turtles,230
according to a National Academy of Sciences study, shrimp trawl nets are found to be the
greatest threat to sea turtles in that they have killed “more sea turtles than all other human
activities combined.”231 Throughout the world, it is estimated that around 124,000 sea turtles per
year are entangled and drown in shrimp trawling nets.232
The U.S. government has long been concerned with the plight of the sea turtles, and
considerable research has been done on the sea turtle population in the waters surrounding the
U.S and such research finds out that the sea turtle is a biological indicator of the health of the

http://www.earthjustice.org/regional/international/forestrpt.pdf (Last visit on March 1).
227
Benjamin Simmons, supra note 4, at 414.
228
Id. at 422.
229
Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, supra note 13, at 277-78.
230
Such as the international trade in tortoise shell, beachfront development, exploratory oil and gas drilling, ocean
dumping (including plastics), dredge and fill operations, power boats, commercial fishing, ghost nets, pollution, and
the appetite the people of some nations have for sea turtle eggs. Kathleen Doyle Yaninek, Turtle Excluder Device
Regulations: Laws Sea Turtles Can Live With, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 256, 263-64 (1995).
231
Kathleen Doyle Yaninek, p256.
232
Benjamin Simmons, supra note 4, at 423.

45
marine eco-system.233 The U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973 (hereinafter “ESA”)234 lists the
six sea turtle species found in U.S. waters as “threatened” or “endangered.”235 In 1987, the U.S.
issued regulations pursuant to the ESA to require all United States shrimp trawl vessels to use
approved Turtle Excluder Devices (“TEDs”) 236 or tow-time restrictions in U.S. waters where
there was a significant mortality of sea turtles in shrimp harvesting.237 TEDs are inexpensive and
effective devices which are capable of reducing the incidental catch of sea turtles.238 According
to the National Marine Fisheries Service, the devices saved ninety-seven percent of the sea
turtles caught in the nets.239
In 1991, Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter “Section 609”), which is
twofold and consists of subsection 609(a) and (b),240 was enacted by the U.S. so as to protect sea
turtles internationally.241 Section 609(a) required the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations for
the development of bilateral and multilateral agreements for the protection of sea turtles. 242
Subsection 609(b)(1) introduced a general ban on the import of shrimp or shrimp products
harvested with fishing technology that threatens sea turtles. Under Section 609(b)(2), only those
nations who received certification from the U.S. Department of State were not affected by the
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import control.243 The U.S. Department of State would grant certification to a nation if it either: 1)
provided “documentary evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program governing the
incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of commercial shrimp trawl harvesting that is
comparable to that of the United States;” or 2) had a “fishing environment which does not pose a
threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting.”244
Subsequently, the Department of State issued the 1991 guidelines for the certification process.
245

By virtue of the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”), 246 the 1991

guidelines were revised in 1996.247
After the failure of reaching an agreement through consultation pursuant to the procedures of
the WTO DSU, in January 1997, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand separately called for the
establishment of a panel in order to examine their complaints regarding the enactment of Section
609 and the 1996 Guidelines. 248 Their main argument was that the U.S. regulations were in
breach of its obligations under the General Agreement for the measures in question were an
obvious violation of Article I:1 (Most Favored Nation Treatment), XI:1 (Elimination of
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Quantitative Restrictions), and XIII:1 (Differential Treatment of Like Products) and were not
covered by the exceptions under Article XX (b) and XX (g).249
The U.S. did not challenge the view that Section 609 was inconsistent with Article XI, 250
thus it only requested the Panel to find that Section 609 and its implementing measures fell
within the scope of Article XX, paragraphs (b) and (g) of GATT 1994.251
The complainants heavily relied on the GATT panel decisions regarding Tuna/Dolphin I and
Tuna/Dolphin II in which it had been set forth that Article XX exceptions had to be interpreted in
a strict fashion and that they cannot be used by states to adopt measures with a view to force
other contracting parties to change their national environmental policies, in any case.252
On May 15, 1998, the Panel issued its report which gives rise to much controversy. In this
report, the Panel found that “the wording of Section 609 and the interpretation made of it by the
CIT are sufficient evidence that the United States imposes a ‘prohibition or restriction’ within the
meaning of Article XI” and thus drew the conclusion that Section 609 violated Article XI:1.253
And the Panel further considered that, given its opinion about Article XI:1, it was not necessary
to review the other claims of the complainants with respect to Articles I:1 and XIII:1.254
As far as Article XX is concerned, the Panel held that because the requirement of the
chapeau conditions was not met by Section 609 and the exceptions in Article XX could be
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passed muster only when those conditions were satisfied, the U.S. regulations could not be saved
by Article XX.255
The U.S. challenged the Panel’s decision before the Appellate Body of the WTO. While the
Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s judgment in favor of the claimants, the report256 issued in
October 1998 was based on a very different legal reasoning and analysis.257 Just as is discussed
infra, this report, which contains and analyzes quite a few issues, is of great significance for the
comprehension of the change of attitude of the WTO towards TREMs.
2. The Interpretation of Article XX Exception under GATT: Two-step Approach
The Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body report is a landmark in the development of GATT Article
XX jurisprudence.258 Though it does not thoroughly flesh out Article XX, the decision represents
“the most comprehensive and thorough analysis” of Article XX by any WTO dispute settlement
system.259 The conclusion in respect of the compatibility of Section 609 with Article XX drawn
by the Appellate Body is that while aiming at the protection and conservation of an exhaustible
natural resource, Section 609 was applied in a discriminatory manner, which rendered it
inconsistent with the Chapeau of Article XX. 260 This implies that, if Section 609 had been
applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, it would have been held WTO-legal.
a. Two-step Approach
Prior to commencing its own Article XX analysis, the Appellate Body held that the Panel had
made an error in determining that measures undermining the WTO multilateral trading system
were not within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX. 261 The
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Appellate Body reiterated the two-step approach of analysis as defined in Reformulated Gasoline
case. 262 Firstly, it should be examined whether or not the measures fall under one of the
enumerated categories outlined in the paragraphs of Article XX. Secondly, further appraisal
should be made to see whether the same measures meet the requirement of the Chapeau.263 The
Appellate Body pointed out that “The sequence of steps indicated above in the analysis of a
claim of justification under Article XX reflects, not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the
fundamental structure and logic of Article XX.”264
b. The First Step: Analysis in Reference to Article XX (g)
After the two-step approach was established, the next step for the Appellate Body to evolve
the analysis was to determine whether the U.S. measures could be covered by any of the specific
of paragraphs of Article XX.265 Since Article XX (b) was relied on by the United States only in
the alternative, 266 the Appellate Body’s report focused in particular on the interpretation of
GATT Article XX (g). 267 The Appellate Body found that Section 609 can be provisionally
justified under paragraph (g).268
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Then the Appellate Body undertook its own analysis of Article XX (g). At the outset, it drew
the conclusion that the sea turtles constitute “exhaustible natural resources” for purposes of
paragraph (g).269 Textually, the Appellate Body held that Article XX (g) is not limited to the
conservation of “mineral” or “non-living” natural resources.270 The words of Article XX (g),
crafted more than 50 years ago, had to be interpreted in the light of contemporary concerns of the
community of nations about protection and conservation of the environment. 271 Therefore,
natural resources should embrace both living and non-living resources, including sea turtles.
Here, the fashion in which the problem of exhaustible natural resources was dealt with
significantly deviated from that embodied in Tuna/Dolphin I and II.272 The policy objectives and
the nature of the measures at stake were paid more attention than the “marginal aspects” of
conservation problems, such as the aim of a particular measure.273
Secondly, the Appellate Body examined the question whether the U.S. measure related to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. From a chronological point of view, this
expression -“relating to”- was interpreted in the sense that only those measures “primarily aimed
at” protection and conservation of exhaustible natural resources could be justified under Article
XX (g). 274 However, arguably the Appellate Body adopted a more open approach in the
reasoning of this issue. After having referred to the “primarily aimed at” rule of interpretation, 275
the Shrimp/Turtle report went further to say that Section 609 was “reasonably related to” an
environmental end and was neither “a simple, blanket prohibition of the importation of shrimp
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imposed without regard to the consequences” nor “disproportionately wide in its scope.”276 It
seems that the threshold implied in these words was lower than the one entailed by the traditional
view. 277 As a result, it is arguable that future GATT panels and the Appellate Body may be
prepared to follow such a laxer interpretation.278
Finally, the Appellate Body held that Section 609 was “made effective in conjunction with
the restrictions on domestic harvesting of shrimp” and was an even-handed measure.279
As a consequence, the Appellate body concluded that Section 609 was “provisionally
justified under Article XX (g).”280
c. The Second Step: Justification under the Chapeau
Section 609 must also satisfy the requirements of the introductory clauses of Article XX if it
is ultimately to be justified as an exception under Article XX.281 It means that the measure at
stake must not be applied in a manner which would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade.
The following points were relied on by the Appellate Body to establish that Section 609 had
been applied in a manner that constituted an unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevailed: 282 1) “essentially the same comprehensive regulatory
program” was imposed by the U.S. in relation to countries that may have been in different
conditions; 283 2) “shrimp caught using methods identical to those employed in the U.S. were
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excluded from” the American market unless the country of origin had been certified;284 and 3)
the U.S. had failed to explore cooperative measures for the protection and conservation of sea
turtles prior to undertake the shrimp embargo.285
In addition, this rigidity and inflexibility embodied in the requirement of Section 609 also
constituted “arbitrary discrimination” within the meaning of the chapeau.286 The Appellate Body
also found that the certification processes followed by the U.S. appeared to be singularly
informal and casual, and conducted without any participation of the applying country.287
So, the manner of the application of the U.S. measure constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination between Members of the WTO contrary to the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XX and the measure therefore could not be justified under the Article XX exceptions.288
3. Two Changes: the Attitude to PPMs and Acceptance of Amicus Curiae Briefs
a. Attitude to PPMs
Prior to the issue of the Appellate Body’s report on Shrimp/Turtle, traditionally, the view has
been taken that discriminations between goods that have been produced by different production,
processing and manufacturing methods (PPMs) are inconsistent with the GATT in that “like”
products cannot be treated differently and products cannot be considered “unlike” only because
they are produced in different ways.289 In Tuna/Dolphin I, the Panel claimed that products could
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not be characterized by their PPMs for purposes of legal treatment under the GATT.290 Several
years later, in Tuna/Dolphin II, another panel came to the same conclusion holding that under the
GATT a state should not be allowed to treat products differently on the basis of PPMs but only
on the inherent characteristics of the products.291
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, it was argued that there was no difference between shrimp caught
using TEDs and that caught by other methods. 292 Regarding this issue, the Appellate Body
implicitly indicated that the WTO does not categorically disallow the use of TREMs that are
based not on the characteristics of the product(s), but rather on PPMs from which the product(s)
are derived.293 “No distinction has been drawn by the Appellate Body between discrimination of
like products and discrimination of unlike ones.”294 The Appellate Body’s silence regarding the
fact that the U.S. import ban was a PPM-based measure “signals a tolerance for PPM-based trade
restrictions” that is significant to the international trade community. 295 It seems that the
Appellate Body has tacitly opened the door to import restrictions based on PPMs.296
b. Acceptance of Amicus Curiae Briefs
That there was a lack of opportunity in the GATT context for citizen and non-government
organizations (“NGOs”) to participate in the dispute resolution process has drawn much
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criticism.297 In response, Article 13.2 of the DSU provides that: “Panels may seek information
from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their technical opinion on certain
aspects of the matter.” 298 Pursuant to such a provision, two groups of NGOs tried to submit
amicus briefs directly to the Shrimp/Turtle Panel. 299 Nevertheless, through analyzing the
language of Article 13 of the DSU, the Panel considered that “the initiative to seek information
and to select the source of information rests with the Panel” and accepting non-requested
information from non-governmental sources would be incompatible with the provisions of the
DSU.300
The ruling of the Panel was overruled by the Appellate Body, who decided to accept one
revised amicus brief submitted directly to it and three new NGO amicus briefs attached to the
U.S. submission.301 The Appellate Body reasoned that when Article 13 was read in conjunction
with Articles 11 and 12, it allowed the panel discretion to accept and consider unrequested
information submitted by non-members, 302 as long as it does not unduly delay the panel
process.303 Allowing such discretion is regarded by the Appellate Body as necessary to enable a
dispute resolution body to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements.” 304
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In Shrimp/Turtle case, for the first time an NGO had successfully submitted an amicus brief
directly to a WTO dispute resolution body.305 More importantly, acceptance of submissions by
uninterested parties “displays the WTO’s realization that its expertise is in the field of trade, not
the environment” as well as “shows the WTO’s commitment to ensure adequate information
exchange.”306
The implication of the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs is that environmental interests will
gain a greater chance than before to influence the WTO DSB decision-making process. This
implicates that there is a greater chance that the trend of environmental protection will further tilt
the scale toward justifiable TREMs.
4. The Progeny of Shrimp/Turtle
Three years after the issue of the Appellate Body Report on Shrimp/Turtle dispute, i.e., in
2001, the Appellate Body again got a chance to clarify and elaborate on its original holding.307
One of the Shrimp/Turtle complainants, Malaysia, challenged the revised measures the U.S. had
adopted in response to the Appellate Body decision.308 This second Appellate Body panel held
that the corrective measures taken by the U.S., permitting shipment-by-shipment certification,
were applied in a manner that met the requirement of Article XX of the GATT 1994,309 and that
the U.S. was not required to obtain the conclusion of an international environmental
agreement.310
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From the aforesaid examination of the GATT/WTO TREMs jurisprudence, one can readily
discover that the GATT has been construed more and more favorable to justifiable TREMs. Then
what should developing countries do in such a situation, taking no steps to improve the
environment and then passively being put into imperil of becoming the targets of TREMs or
internalizing environmental protection cost and then taking their fate into their own hand? The
next chapter, by resorting to economic analysis, tries to argue that the latter is the right, and
ultimate, choice.

agreement be concluded by the United States in order to avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ in applying
its measure would mean that any country party to the negotiations with the United States, whether a WTO Member
or not, would have, in effect, a veto over whether the United States could fulfill its WTO obligations. Such a
requirement would not be reasonable.” See Shrimp/Turtle 21.5 Report, supra note 309, para. 123.
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CHPATER V
APPROACHES TO THE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT: FROM
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COST
INTERNALIZATION
Discussion and analysis above may give one a relatively clear conception of how the GATT
Dispute Settlement System has been responding to TREMs and of the nature of TREMs.
However, that the WTO DSB has reached a decision in every case above does not mean that the
deeper-level problem, that is, the stark tension between trade liberalization and environmental
protection, has been solved or lessened to any meaningful extent. The cases above at best
manifest that TREMs, even those adopted by a nondiscriminatory means, will touch off more
disputes and friction in the international community, especially when the developing countries
whose exportation has been greatly affected by such measures are filled with resentfulness.
At bottom, it should be conceded that to some extent the environmental function of TREMs
is limited. First of all, to those countries that are capable of giving the environmental objective
priority but not willing to do so, the imposing of TREMs on them may offer them an incentive to
protect the environment, 311 especially when trade is the direct cause of environmental
degradation. However, as far as those countries that are unable to promptly come up to pertinent
environmental standards due to lack of capital and technology, it will be neither fair nor
appropriate to impose TREMs on them.

311

Tianhong Wang, Lun Duobian Huanjing Tiaoyue yu WTO/GATT de Xietiao [On the Coordination of Multilateral
Environmental Treaties and WTO/GATT], supra note 7, at 420.

58
Secondly, usually the effect and influence of a TREM is hard to be long-term and continuous.
Only when the country that is the target of a TREM accepts the point of view of the country
enacting the TREMs and goes further to put such propositions into practice, will there be
possibility of resolving the problem of environmental protection.
Besides, in terms of the unilateral aspect and extra-jurisdictional application of TREMs, the
country imposing TREMs is vulnerable to criticisms that it is violating the national sovereignty
principle by commandeering other countries to establish domestic environmental policy. And the
situation will become even worse once the TREM is challenged before the WTO DSB because
generally speaking, as mentioned above, the procedure will be time-consuming and costs a lot
for both parties and it will imperil the harmony among nations more or less. So it is not very
difficult for us to find out that TREMs are not the most effective method to resolve the
intractable trade-environment conflict.
Some approaches to the trade-environment conflict and possible solutions have been
proposed. One argument is that the GATT may be used to incorporate environmental issues into
international trade. Although the GATT is not well suited for the consideration of current
environmental and conservation concerns, “it is not inherently incapable of dealing with
them.” 312 Therefore, what should be done is to “green” the GATT. Just as discussed supra,
however, there are some structural flaws embedded in the GATT system to strike balance
between trade and environment, and the process of the WTO DSB is also time-consuming and
costs high.
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Others recommend that an effective, fair and efficient new forum with a dispute settlement
system should be created to further both economic and ecological interests.313 This seems also
not a very good idea for its complexity and uncertainty.
Finally, some have argued that MEAs could help address the trade-environment conflict. In
particular, MEAs would be the most appropriate to deal with those disputes with regard to the
PPM issue, since they can lend internationally negotiated solutions to environmental concerns.314
However, as someone has pointed out, the disadvantages of the classic treaty approach are quite
evident.315 First, the drafting, adoption, putting into effect and revision of MEAs are all intricate
and time-consuming tasks. Second, transaction costs of this approach will be prohibitively high
on account of the fact that this approach gives states the chance for “opportunistic” behavior,
since legislative international intervention will have to respond to an evolving international
environmental problem repeatedly.316
This thesis, however, will try to argue below that to resolve the trade-environment conflict, it
will be an instructive and feasible attempt to make cost internalization a substitute for the
traditional “comparative advantage theory” as the basis of the international trade regime.
A. The Traditional Basis of International Trade Regime and Its Defects
It is well-known that the doctrine of comparative advantage is the basis upon which the
international trade regime rested. However, there are some flaws about this doctrine so as not to
allow a proper consideration of contemporary environmental interests.
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The doctrine of comparative advantage was first introduced to us by the English economist
David Ricardo in 1817.317 He explained that:
“Under a system of perfectly free [international] commerce, each country naturally devotes
its capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of
individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. By
stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar
powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labour most effectively and most economically: while,
by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit ... ”318
The doctrine of comparative advantage holds that by the aid of free trade, if one nation can
export the commodity in which it has an advantage and import the commodity in which it has a
disadvantage,319 the efficiency and quantity of international production will be increased and in a
result, greater aggregate welfare will be achieved.320 “Under this theory, trade restrictions are
inefficient and divert resources from their highly valued uses.”321
However, environmental problems are ones involving externalities. In the field of
microeconomics, externalities occur when production or consumption imposes uncompensated
costs or benefits on other parties. 322 And there are two kinds of externalities, positive
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externalities (external economies) and negative externalities (external diseconomies).
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Environmental pollution usually is a typical exemplification of the negative externalities.
“Economists saw the problem of environmental degradation as one in which economic agents
imposed external costs upon society at large in the form of pollution.”324 Since externality is one
of the three most important cases in which market failure325 can happen and leads to inefficient
production or consumption, 326 due to the externality of the environmental problems, markets
provide incorrect signals involving the environmental issues. That means: because of the
nonexclusive characteristic of the environmental consumption activities, such circumstances will
occur in which everyone would like to enjoy the benign environment such as clean air and water
while nobody is willing to pay for it and hope to benefit from the behaviors by others of
managing and addressing the environmental problems.327 Such phenomenon is called “free rider”
behavior in the nomenclature of microeconomics.
Under this circumstance, devoid of constraints imposed by laws and regulations, enterprises
would not voluntarily adopt measures to reduce the environmental pollution or try to address
environmental issues related to their production in pursuing the maximum profits. In
consequence, the price of the product of such enterprises only reflects the market cost and
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transaction cost and precludes the environmental cost.328 “With no ‘prices’ to provide the proper
incentives for reduction of polluting activities, the inevitable result was excessive demands on
the assimilative capacity of the environment.”329 As a result, it can be inferred that the economic
growth promoted in the above-mentioned milieu is obtained in an unsustainable way and that
market cannot allocate the environmental resources effectively due to the externality will
extremely deteriorated the environment.
The other inherent flaw embedded in the comparative advantage doctrine is its ignorance of
the scarcity of resources which is one of the most significant economic premises. 330 The
comparative advantage doctrine is based on the traditional viewpoint which believes that
resources are limitless. It is understandable that at that time when the industrialization was still
not initiated and the resources consumed away and the level of the environmental degradation
were all within the self-renovated spectrum which the global ecosystem can tolerate. It was then
generally conceived that nothing, including natural resources, is of value without the anticipation
of human labor.331 However, the Industrial Revolution and particularly the violent development
of production as well as the swift expansion of market in the wake of the World War II have
reshaped the old notion and the scarcity of natural resources has been well acknowledged. In
light of such change, humankind, for the existence of itself and the future generations, has to face
the externality of the environmental issues and should endeavor to internalize the environmental
protection costs and therefore resolve the trade-environment conflict.
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B. Internalization of Environmental Protection Costs: the Economic Approach
In this part, the economic approach is utilized to argue that internalization of environmental
protection costs may be the most plausible way addressing the conflict between trade and
environment. Here, the term “internalization of environmental protection costs” means bringing
the environmental protection costs into the aggregate production costs of one commodity (or
placing an appropriate “price” on polluting activities) so as to eliminate the externality in the
process of employing resources and protecting the environment.
1. Differing Degrees of Environmental Protection Cost Internalization: the Root Drive
Force behind the TREMs
At the present time, a wide variation exists in the levels of internalization of different nations
in the international community. Generally speaking, developed countries have both an earlier
beginning and earlier consummation of the Industrial Revolution than developing countries.
Thus, they have undergone a sea of troubles caused by the “economic development first,
environmental protection second” policy. In addition, due to the public awareness of the
environmental issues and the prevailing of the green consumption which result from the
improvement of the living standards and the enhancement of the educational level, most
developed countries enacted relatively more stringent environmental standards and technical
requirement and further put them into effect. Furthermore, with the benefit of their economic and
technical advantages, developed countries are capable of adopting high environmental standards
as well as have the adequate capital to make scientific researches on environmental problems.
As a result, the level of environmental cost internalization of developed countries is generally
higher than that of developing countries; and the full production cost of one product made by an
enterprise in developed countries may to a great extent be higher than that of the like product
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made in countries with lax environmental standards, since the product made in developed
countries contain higher environmental cost. Obviously, the enterprise will not assume the
expenses and cost for the pollution control, instead it will include such cost into the market price
of the product. So the products of countries with stringent environmental regulations may lose
some market share in both domestic market and international market due to their disadvantaged
position in the battle of prices.332
In these circumstances, it is quite natural that developed countries feel that they suffer unjust
treatment.333 In terms of the integral nature of the Earth ecosystem and the global aspect of the
environmental issues, every nation should bear inescapable responsibility for the environment
protection and the conservation of global commons. “After all, everyone has to share the planet,
including current and future generations of both developed and developing nations.”334 The loose
environmental policy carried out by some developing countries can be regarded as free-rider
behavior on the international level. In addition, such policy will make developing countries
ignore their obligation bound to the global environment and aggravate their domestic even the
global environmental degradation. Even worse, the behavior of developing countries with lax
environmental standards will induce developed countries to lower their environmental policy and
then bring about the promulgation of “race to the bottom” legislation, “competition in laxity” and
“eco-dumping.”335
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In a sense, due to the globalization of trade, the lax environmental control pursued by
developing countries, in fact, is to shift part of their domestic expenses on the prevention and
cure of pollution to those countries with higher environmental cost internalization level. Maybe
this is the very root reason why some developed countries appealed to TREMs for help.
2. Developing Countries at the Crossroads: Internalization as the Ultimate Choice 336
Then, what course should the developing countries follow? Well, developing countries
should do the best they could to internalize the environmental externalities on account of the
following four reasons. This is not only the good strategy to cope with TREMs, but only would
be in the long-term interest of developing countries themselves.337
a. The Shifted Attitude under WTO toward TREMs
The first reason is that, under the WTO dispute settlement system, as long as disputes related
to TREMs are concerned, the weighing scale has subtly leaned toward environmental concerns.
Although arguably the central focus of the WTO Agreement seems to remain “the promotion of
economic development through trade”338 and the environmental protection is not its basic aim, in
the milieu of the graveness of environmental issues and its impact thereof, the legal regime and
fundamental rules of the GATT cannot immunize themselves from the pervasiveness of the
“green tide.”
In Chapter IV of this thesis, we have reviewed the history of the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement case law chronologically. As analyzed therein, the Appellate Body report on the

developing countries will experience a chilling effect on environmental regulation because lax environ-mental
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Shrimp/Turtle case marked a decisive moment in the history of GATT/WTO dealing with
TREMs.
In the first place, the Appellate Body report supports the view that there is “a move towards a
fuller recognition of environmental concerns as a possible ground for departing from the general
principles of the free trade regime.”339 The Appellate Body seems to begin to lay more emphasis
on the goal of sustainable development set up in the new preamble of WTO.340 Taking this into
account, it can be reasonably inferred that had the authorities of the United States enacted a
system of hearings or a fairer and more open certification procedure, Section 609 would have
been held GATT-legal.341 In fact, the WTO DSB has dropped such a hint that in addressing the
similar disputes to the Shrimp/Turtle case in the future, one contracting country may use
unilateral TREMs to protect the environment and the exhausting species given that a multilateral
negotiation is initiated but fails to come to any outcome, as long as such TREMs comport with
the requirements under the chapeau of GATT Article XX.342
In the next place, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle case changed its attitude of
disapproval toward the TREMs involving PPMs and it strongly indicated that it would not
absolutely prohibit PPMs-based TREMs. Therefore, it has left the door open for the possibility
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that non-discriminatory process-based measures are in accord with the GATT.343 This approach
is of great importance to the environmental protection. The traditional “like product” theory,
upon which the nondiscriminatory principle of the GATT bases, maintains that the same
treatment should be applied and the products should be considered “like products” no matter how
differently the effects of two products will impose on the environment in its life cycle, so long as
such products have the same final use and the like physical constitution. This theory may induce
an enterprise to produce and transport products and dispose waste in the highest level of
environmental externality so as to reduce the production costs. The competition in laxity may
ensue as a consequence. To date, PPMs are an increasingly frequent form of environmental
regulation.344 “In an ecologically interdependent world, pollution created in the manufacturing
process can be as harmful as pollution caused by the product itself.”345 Maybe just realizing that
precluding the employ of PPMs-based TREMs will in fact deprive nations of a powerful tool to
pursue sustainable development,
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the WTO finally expressed its recognition in the

Shrimp/Turtle case that the distinguishable effects of products on the environment in the life
cycle may become a criterion to differentiate the “like product.” So it is not surprising that,
opining that TREMs shall not be distinguished on the basis whether they are based on PPMs or
something else, one prominent scholar has predicted that “the product-process distinction will
probably not survive and perhaps should not survive.”347 Also, it is worth mentioning that the
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs means that environmental interests have a greater chance than
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before to influence the WTO DSB decision-making process. This implicates that there is greater
chance that the trend of environmental protection will further tilt scale toward justifiable TREMs.
All in all, in terms of the newest environmental trend manifested in the process of addressing
TREMs disputes by the WTO DSB, it can be envisaged that there is a much greater possibility
for the developing countries that are affected by the TREMs to lose the case before the WTO
DSB. So, at least in the legal regime of WTO, it will be a wise decision for developing nations to
internalize environmental costs. If developing countries still persist in their old standpoint, just as
discussed infra, they will not only fall into a terrible vicious circle but also continue to be
disconcerted by the attack of TREMs.
b. The Approach of Economic Analysis
Besides the reason discussed supra, as a matter of fact, the result occasioned by the
approach of environmental cost internalization is not as dreadful as some developing countries
have feared. This point is clearly illustrated by the following hypothetical example. Let’s use the
U.S. and Mexico in this hypothesis. The former is a developed country on a high level of
environmental protection and the latter is a developing country whose environmental regulation
is much laxer in comparison. Assume that Mexico, after its exportation to the U.S. is affected by
a TREM enacted by the U.S., is considering internalizing the environmental cost but fears that
such internalization (for example, improving the domestic environmental standards, enacting
more stringent environmental law and regulations or preparing itself to participate in more ecolabeling schemes) will increase the production cost of the home-made products dramatically and
then have a negative influence upon their competitive edge in the international as well as
domestic markets. Mexico will be concerned about the possible pecuniary losses and hindrance
to the domestic economic development as a consequence of internalization.
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In the first scenario, we suppose that one company of the U.S. need to pay 50,000 dollars to
eliminate the environmental externality, such as purchasing environmental technology or
facilities, and we further suppose the real purchasing power of Dollar in the U.S. is the same as
that of Peso in Mexico and Mexico has the same environmental technology or can produce the
same facilities, to reach the like level of the environmental cost internalization with the U.S.
Thus, a competitive company in Mexico only needs to pay 50,000 Pesos. However, according to
the international currency exchange rate, one dollar equals 4 or even more Pesos. Therefore,
since their products will compete with each other in the international market, the environmental
cost spent by Mexico is much lower than that spent by the U.S. when the international currency
exchange rate is taken into consideration. As a result, even though Mexico makes a decision to
internalize the environmental cost, its products will still retain the price advantage in the
international market, though the advantage is not as great as that before the internalization.
The second possible scenario: suppose the real purchasing power of Peso in the Mexico is
different from that of Dollar in the U.S. and such difference is exactly reflected in the exchange
rate, that is, the real purchasing power of one dollar equals four or even more Pesos. Under such
a circumstance, if Mexico is able to develop the same environmental technology or produce the
same facilities, it will cost the company in Mexico 50,000 dollars; if Mexico is not able to obtain
such technology or facilities of itself, the company then need to purchase such technology or
facilities in the international market (or from the U.S.), the expenses paid by the company is still
50,000 dollars. Under this circumstance, undoubtedly, Mexico cannot keep up to a comparative
advantage in Scenario I. However, because of the differences of other factors such as labor cost
and land-use fee, the price of the Mexican product is still not necessarily higher than that of the
American like product. Thus, Mexico may still retain some price advantage.
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Of course, the third scenario could not be dispelled: by virtue of the financial and technical
disadvantages of Mexico, it will cost Mexico dear to come to the same environmental standards
with the U.S. and therefore the like product of Mexico loses its price advantage and market
competitiveness in the end. 348 In this situation, it is the time for developing countries to unite
together and negotiate with developed countries so as to secure from them necessary technical
and financial assistance in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. 349 And history repeatedly bears out that it is not impossible for developing
countries to obtain from developed ones reasonable concessions, if they act in cooperation and
association.350 The argument that the developed world should give incentives to encourage the
Third World to participate in global environmental regimes can be justified as a matter of
fundamental international equity.351 Firstly, developed countries should answer for most of the
current environmental problems which are caused by their industrialization. Even nowadays
developed world does not do better than the developing countries with regard to the emission of
noxious gases and the consumption of natural resources.352 Secondly, “while developed nations
would be asked to pay up belatedly for globally experienced or threatened environmental costs
associated with their economic and social development”, developing countries “are asked to
share the burden of controls without having derived comparable compensating socioeconomic
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benefits.”353 Thirdly, environmental cost internalization may preempt developing countries from
exercising what might have been their “natural” development options. 354 Finally, developed
countries should undertake corresponding responsibility for their behaviors that they transferred
pollution industries and imported a lot of primary products from developing countries and caused
the latter’s environment degraded.
As a result, in the international community, developed countries should adhere to the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and render compensatory and/or
technical incentives to developing countries in exchange for their support rather than adopt
TREMs which will probably result in misunderstanding and conflicts.355 In the long run, it will
not only make a contribution toward the common interests of humankind but also benefit
developed countries themselves because many environmental issues such as climate change and
the exploitation of natural resources cannot be satisfactorily tackled on a national basis.356 Lack
of the cooperation of the Third World, the environmental objectives will be hard to be secured.
After all, no state is an isolated island.357
c. The Issue of Competitive Advantage
In short term, the internalization of environmental costs will increase the production cost and
thus the product prices will go up in terms of the absolute value. Nevertheless, it should not be
ignored that the environment-friendly products are becoming more and more welcomed in the
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market because the green concept has been deeply rooted in the hearts of people and the green
consumption has become more and more popular. An investigation made in 1990 showed that
sixty-seven percent of the Dutch, eighty percent of the German and seventy-seven percent of the
Americans will take environmental concerns into account when they purchase certain
merchandise.358 In 1992, the Canadian Consumers’ Association conducted an investigation too
and found out that 94% of the Canadian consumers would consider environment issues.359
It is clear that where public awareness of environmental issues is high among the consumers
and the green preference of the consumers has strengthened, the consumers are willing to pay
that part of price which results from the environmental cost internalization. Therefore, the
producers will gain a competitive advantage through their “green” image and may obtain a
broader market prospect instead of lose market share. 360 And it can be inferred that the
environment-unfriendly products will be put at a disadvantage in the end. This is also a very
important reason that compels developing countries to internalize their environmental protection
cost.
d. To Avoid a Vicious Circle
If developing countries keep to their old notion and do not endeavor to address the
environmental externality, a vicious circle will probably come forth.361
On the one hand, poverty easily drives developing countries to pursue economic
development to the extent that they forget to care for the environment or overlook the

globally.” See VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, supra note 15, at 7. And North/South cooperation is imperative to
effective environmental policy making. See Richard Skeen, supra note 8, at 171.
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environmental interests completely.362 They are not willing to internalize the environmental cost,
but rather buck for temporal development at any cost. As a result, the natural resources are
depleted unlimitedly and the environmental problems become more and more severe.
On the other hand, the rising of green tide and the adoption of TREMs have a great impact on
the exportation of developing countries. Even if the WTO DSB makes a decision in favor of
developing countries, the substantive pecuniary losses have become irretrievable in great part. In
addition, the preference of consumers to the environment-friendly products and the squeezingout effect of environment-friendly products to environment-unfriendly products therewith will
exert a significantly negative effect on the exportation of the products of developing countries
with low environmental added-value. In the end, the competitive advantages at the disastrous
cost of the domestic ecological environment and human, animal or plant life or health will vanish
gradually. And the most dreadful thing is that in the wake of becoming more impoverished,
developing countries which are not capable of adopting new environmental standards and
develop new environmental technologies due to a lack of money will fall into a vicious circle.
So, the task of top priority is to squarely face the environmental problems instead of shirking,
resisting and rejecting participation in the negotiation of “Green Round.” Although to some
extent it is necessary for the Third World to bargain with developed countries to advance their
interests, what should be borne in mind is that protecting the environment and promoting the
sustainable development of economy has become the inevitable trend of social development.
Developing countries should not and have no reason to escape from their responsibility on the
global environmental protection. When all is said and done, we only have one earth.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Up to this stage, this thesis has argued that, instead of being only thinly-disguised non-tariff
barriers, TREMs are a product of the deep conflict between trade and environment. The conflict
may partly be attributed to the defects of the comparative advantage theory, on which the world
free trade framework as represented by GATT/WTO is based. The comparative advantage theory
does not take into due consideration the externality of environmental problems and the scarcity
of natural resources. This kind of failure may be fatal, if not addressed adequately and in time.
And the only way to address it is to internalize environmental costs.
In so arguing, special emphasis has been placed upon developing countries. It is
painstakingly pointed out that environmental cost internalization is not necessarily bad for
developing countries and that in the long run it is good for developing countries’ self-interest.
But also as indicated above, to do so, developing countries at least will lose some edge in
competitiveness of their products. This price may be high, in their eyes. But isn’t the price of
depleting the earth’s precious resources, its fragile ecosystem, the ozone layer, the oceans and
the forests even higher? Considering that the price developing countries need to pay may help
save the planet, the price seems a great bargain compared with the high price that the earth and
its inhabitants will end up paying if global environmental security as a whole continues to be
ignored or inadequately addressed. 363 Please remember: the natural environment when viewed as
a resource is a finite one, and the global environment is irreplaceable.364
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That special emphasis is placed on developing countries does not mean that developed
countries do not have obligations. Their first obligation is not to promulgate TREMs as a
disguise of trade protectionism. Their second obligation is to respond positively to reasonable
requests of cooperation and concession from developing countries. Anyway, it is the developed
world that should bear greater responsibility for the degradation of the earth’s environment.365
Developed countries need to take up the responsibility to help developing countries to realize
internalization by the ways of, for example, technological transfer and capital investment and so
on. It shall also be remembered that that TREMs have their reasonableness does not mean that it
is appropriate for developed countries to enact more and more TREMs unilaterally, especially in
light of the fact that TREMs have only limited benefits.366 Too many TREMs may only have one
consequence: too much friction between developed and developing countries. This is not good at
all for the solving of the trade-environment conflict. Environmental problems are not isolated in
one or another country. They are global, universal, and intricately interwoven. To solve problems
of such great dimensions, the only way is: everyone must cooperate on a global level and comply
with the principles of intergenerational equity in order to preserve the natural environment and
all its resources for future generations. 367

365
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